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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

------.
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
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DON C. COFFEY,
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Defendant-Appellant.
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Defendant appeals from a
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bad check in violation of Utah Code Ann.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant was tried before a jury

which.,~ .. '·~··
·.. ''.)

a verdict of guilty.

. '··/ '

The Honorable Allen B. Soreaaen
,.

~

<'l

entered judgment on that verdict, and sentenced defendant;
to an indeterminate term of not less than one nor more
than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming the judgment rendered below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Deputy County Attorney Gary Stott presented a
stipulation that if Dorothy Gardner, an officer of the
Dixie State Bank, were called to testify,her testimony
would be that on July 29, 1975, and continuing to the
date of trial, May 24, 1976, there were not sufficient
funds in the

defendant 1 s checking account to clear a

check of $3,560.00.

Mr. Mulliner, the public defender,

asked that the stipulation be modified so as to state that
the insufficiency of funds would only be established for
July 29, 1975, the date on the check in question (Tr,6).
The State called Morris Ercanbrack to testify.

He stated

he was a fruit dealer who had sold a load of cherries to
the defendant, and that the defendant had paid for the
cherries with a check in the amount of $3,560.00.

Morris

Ercanbrack further testified that the defendant represented
the check as good when it was written (Tr.9,12), that the
check was put on collection for nearly one month, and that
the only payment he had received on the check was $1,800.00
from a third party approximately ten months after the
transaction and after criminal proceedings had begun
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(Tr.10).

The public defender cross-examined the witness,

asking if the defendant had not asked that the check be
held for awhile in order to clear (Tr.12).

The witness

answered that the defendant represented that the check
was good when presented.
Randall Ercanbrack testified next for the
State.

Randall's testimony corroborated the fact that

the defendant had represented the check was good when it
was presented (Tr.15).

At the close of the State's case,

the public defender moved to dismiss the case for
insufficiency of the evidence as to the defendant's
criminal intent (Tr.17).
proforma (Tr.18).

The court denied the motion

The public defender then asked for

a recess to confer with the defendant, and after the
recess declined to present any evidence (Tr.19).

The

public defender took exceptions to jury instruction
Nos. 5 and 6 (Tr.20,R.25,26).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
Respondent agrees with the statement of the
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law contained in appellantts brief that a claim of
incompetence of counsel does not entitle a convicted
felon to a reversal on appeal unless an extreme case
is shown, where the trial was reduced to a farce or
.sham.

Appellant's claim for relief appears to be

principally based on People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460,
34 Cal.Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487 (1963), which he cites
as authority for the proposition that an attorney's
lack of preparation, which results in the denial to
the defendant of a crucial defense, is a reversible
flaw.

In the Ibarra case, the defendant was charged

with possession of heroin.

The trial court asked the

defense· counsel if he wished to make a motion to
suppress a capsule of heroin offered as evidence by
the state.

Defense counsel declined because his

client denied possession of the capsule and could not
therefore object to the manner in which the police
obtained it.

The reason articulated by counsel for

refusing to object to the evidence demonstrated an
inexcusable ignorance of the law in California that
a criminal defendant could object to the admission of
narcotic evidence even if he claimed no proprietary
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interest therein.

The California Supreme Court held

that the counsel's ignorance of the law, shown on the
face of the record, which denied the defendant a
crucial defense, entitled defendant to a new trial.
The Ibarra case is distinguishable in several
important respects.

As the California Court later

explained in In Re Saunders, 2 Cal.3d 1033, 1042, 88
Cal.Rptr. 633, 639, 472 P. 2d 921, 927, fn •. 7 (1970):
"Cases involving a failure to
make those careful factual and legal
inquiries and investigations necessary
to a constitutionally adequate defense
are to be distinguished, of course,
from cases wherein counsel, having made
such inquiries and investigations, makes
tactical or strategic decisions-whether wise or unwise when viewed with
the benefit of hindsight--which cause him
not to utilize the fruits of his labors."
(Emphasis in original.)
The principle defense urged by the public defender was
that the State had produced insufficient evidence of criminal
intent as required under the present Utah statute.

Appel-

lant's new counsel urges that the defense should have been
made by allowing appellant to "tell his story" which would
establish his lack of criminal intent.

Appellant's new

counsel is not urging that the wrong defense was asserted,
or that a crucial defense was withdrawn, but that the
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defense was not presented in the proper way.

The public

defender was clearly awe.re of the defense urged by present
counsel (Tr.12,ln.14,Tr.16,ln.3), and nothing in the
record demonstrates that he was unprepared to present it.
The central point of the defense urged by
present counsel is that the appellant had told Mr.
Ercanbrack to hold the check for a certain time until
appellant could arrange his affairs so that the check,
when deposited, would clear.

The evidence produced by

the State directly contradicted this point, and the
public defender might well have thought, as a matter of
tactics, that any testimony he could produce to the
contrary would not help appellant as much as a crossexamination by the State would hurt him.

The thrust

of the defense asserted by the public defender required
that as little evidence as possible as to the appellant's
intent be produced in order to raise a reasonable doubt in
the minds of the jurors.
Present counsel's complaint that the stipulation
as to the Bank officer's testimony is ambiguous and not
probative of appellant's intent is remarkably parallel
to the complaint of the public defender on appeal (see
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original Brief of Appellant, Points I and II).

No credible

claim of incompetence can be assigned on this point.
Present counsel's claim that the check was not
paid because of a stop-payment rather than an insuff icienoy
of funds is not supported by the record (Tr,10), and
irrelevant.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-505 (Supp. 1975), silllpl.y

requires that payment be refused by the drawee, and a stop..
payment is as effective in preyenting payment as an
insufficiency of funds.

Appellant has not demonstrated

incompetence of counsel in this regard.
Present counsel's complaint that the public
defender did not discuss the consequences of a guilty

'ftllS'li~

with the appellant is simply irrelevant to the issue o£
whether a constitutionally adequate defense had been Ul8l1e
by the public defender.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that appellant has not met
his burden of demonstrating that the record affirmativel:;r
shows that appellant was denied effective assistance of
counsel.

Respondent submits that appellant's effort, with

the benefit of hindsight, to speculate as to what may
have been a more effective defense is not a ground
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for
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reversal.

Appellant received the assistance of a capable

member of the bar who presented a good faith legal defens
and the judgment and sentence of the court below should
therefore be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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